When not all objects are acceptable to all agents, maximizing the number of objects actually assigned is an important design concern. We compute the guaranteed size index of the Probabilistic Serial mechanism, i.e., the worst ratio of the actual expected size to the maximal feasible size. It converges decreasingly to 1 1 e ' 63:2% as the maximal size increases. It is the best index of any Envy-Free assignment mechanism.
Introduction

The context
The assignment of indivisible objects to economic agents by means of lotteries is an important example of a "market without money", where randomizing the allocation of objects, or, equivalently in some contexts, implementing time sharing, is the only way to achieve a fair outcome. The familiar real life examples include assigning workers to jobs, jobs to time slots, classes or dormitory rooms to students, school choice ( [2] , [18] ), etc.. See [23] for a survey.
The three normative goals of mechanism design, e¢ ciency, incentive compatibility and fairness, lead the discussion of the assignment problem in the economic literature. The recent literature on algorithmic mechanism design introduces the fourth goal of maximizing a simple measure of social optimality. One of the earliest instances of this approach is [22] , discussing the tradeo¤ between Strategy-Proofness and the utilitarian minimization of aggregate cost. Another seminal example, closer to home, is in the bilateral matching problem. When preferences have ties and are incomplete (remaining single is preferred to some potential partners) not all stable matchings are of the same size (the "rural hospital theorem" does not apply), so it is natural to look for a stable matching of maximal size ( [15] ), or for a maximal cardinality matching with the smallest number of blocking pairs ( [5] ): both questions turn out to be NP-hard. The project [19] , from which the present work is born, explores the tradeo¤s between StrategyProofness on one hand, and maximizing the size of the match on the other, in a variety of assignment and matching problems.
The problem and the punchline
In most practical instances of the assignment problem, incomplete preferences are the norm: in school choice, parents can opt out of the public system; jobs have deadlines which render certain time slots useless; students can live o¤ campus, and so on. Even with strict preferences, e¢ cient assignments can then have very di¤erent sizes (number of agents who receive an object), so the goal of maximizing the size of the actual assignment becomes important in its own right: …lling the largest possible number of slots/seats/jobs, is a component of the system performance, to which public shool administrators, the housing o¢ ce on campus, etc.., are paying attention. We de…ne the size index of an assignment as the ratio of the size of the actual assignment to the maximal feasible size.
Note that the largest feasible size of an assignment only depends upon the bipartite graph of acceptability, and ignores the …ner information in the pro…le of individual preferences. This implies that size maximization frequently con ‡icts with the goals of fairness and incentive compatibility, as is obvious in the following elementary example with two objects a; b and two agents Ann, Bob, who both prefer a to b. If both objects are acceptable to Bob but Ann only accepts a, then assigning a to Ann and b to Bob is the only assignment of maximal size, but it is obviously unfair to Bob, and makes it pro…table for him to report that only a is acceptable, if he prefers a 50% chance of getting a to a 100% chance of b. Here, as in [8] and much of the subsequent literature, we interpret fairness as the well-known Envy-Freeness property, and incentive compatibility as Strategy-Proofness (both de…ned in section 4).
We de…ne the guaranteed m-size index of a random assignment mechanism as its worst size index over all assignment problems such that the maximal size of a feasible assignment is m. We compute the largest guaranteed m-size index r m of any Envy-Free mechanism, and show that it is achieved by the Probabilistic Serial mechanism ( [8] , [7] , [14] ; see section 4), the only known mechanism to date combining EnvyFreeness with Ordinal E¢ ciency. Moreover the sequence r m converges decreasingly to 1 1 e as m grows.
Although the Probabilistic Serial mechanism is not strategy-proof, this result throws some light on the tradeo¤ between size maximization and Strategy-Proofness. Indeed the familiar assignment mechanism Random Priority (a.k.a. serial dictatorship, see [1] ) is strategy-proof, and it was shown in [12] to have a smaller size index than Probabilistic Serial precisely for those problems where the latter achieves its worst case index r m (see section 6 for details). Therefore r m is also an upper bound for the guaranteed m-size index of Random Priority. On the other hand [20] show that a lower bound is 1 (1 1 m+1 ) m 1 m , and the latter sequence converges increasingly to 1 1 e . 1 This con…rms the earlier results in [11] about the asymptotic equivalence of these two benchmark mechanisms. It may well be that the performance of Ran- ) m (see also [4] for a simpler proof and [16] for a generalization to multiple objects).
dom Priority cannot be improved by any other strategy-proof mechanism.
Random assignment with outside options
Fix N the set of agents and A of objects, with respective cardinalities n and q. A preference R i of agent i 2 N is a possibly empty ordered subset of A, written R i = (a 1 ; a 2 ; ; a k ) where a 1 is the best object for i and a k her least preferred acceptable object. Abusing notation, a 2 R i means that a is an acceptable object for i, and R i = ? means that no object is acceptable to i. We write R(A) for the set of individual preferences.
A pro…le of preferences R 2 R(A) de…nes a compatibility bipartite graph E N A: ia 2 E(R) , a 2 R i , describing which objects are acceptable to which agents. An assignment problem is a triple = (N; A; R), and its compatibility graph is written E( ).
An assignment is a N A substochastic ma-
It is feasible at R if, in addition, p ia > 0 ) ia 2 E( ). We write P(E( )), or simply P(E), for the set of feasible assignments at , and P d (E) for the subset of deterministic feasible assignments (p ia = 0; 1 for all i; a). A well known fact (a variant of Birkhof's Theorem) is that the convex hull of
The expected number of objects (or agents) assigned at P is s(P ) = P N A p ia , we call it the size of P . Note that s(P ) minfn; qg. The following nice fact re…nes Birkhof's Theorem. A random assignment is implemented by deterministic assignments of (almost) equal size: any P 2 P(E) is a convex combination of deterministic assignments of size bs(P )c or ds(P )e (lower and upper integral part). 2 In particular the program
has at least one deterministic solution, and every solution is a convex combination of such deterministic assignments. We call s (E( )) the size of the problem , i.e., the maximal number of objects/agents it is feasible to assign. The set of assignment problems of size m is denoted A m . An assignment mechanism F associates to every assignment problem a feasible assignment F ( ) = P 2 P(E( )). We focus in this paper on the worst possible match size that a mechanism can reach, relative to the size of the problem. De…ne the guaranteed m-size index of F as follows
The absolute guaranteed size index of F is
E¢ ciency and guaranteed size
Given a problem and two deterministic assignments P; P 0 2 P d (E( )), we say that P is Pareto superior to P 0 if P 6 = P 0 and fp ia = 1 and p 0 ib = 1g ) aR i b fp ia = 0 for all ag ) fp 0 ia = 0 for all ag An e¢ cient (Pareto optimal) deterministic assignment is one that is not Pareto dominated.
In any problem 2 A m there is at least one e¢ cient deterministic assignment of maximal size m. This follows because if an assignment P 2 P d (E) is Pareto dominated by P 0 , then s(P ) s(P 0 ). On the other hand it is easy to construct problems with e¢ cient deterministic assignments of size 2 ). A useful and well known observation is that in any problem of size m, any e¢ cient deterministic assignment is of size at least m 2 . 3 Therefore any e¢ cient deterministic mechanism has a size index of at least 1 2 . For a general (random) assignment mechanism F , the weakest e¢ ciency requirement is Ex Post E¢ ciency (EPE), requiring that the assignment P be a convex combination of e¢ -cient deterministic assignments. The above observation implies that any ex post e¢ cient assignment mechanism has a guaranteed size of at least 1 2 . This good news is mitigated by the fact, to which we now turn, that other normative requirements of fairness and incentive compatibility place an upper bound on the guaranteed size of the match.
is e¢ cient and of size m 0 , and both agent i and object a are not matched at P , then ia = 2 E, otherwise assigning a to i would be a Pareto improvement of P . It follows that any edge used by a matching feasible at E has at least one endnode matched in P , and there are 2m 0 such nodes.
Three main axioms
Given a problem , agent i compares two feasible assignments P; P 0 2 P(E( )) by means of her own allocations p(i) = (p ia ) a2A and p 0 (i), the i-th rows of P and P 0 respectively. We de…ne a familiar incomplete preference relation for agent i such that R i = (a 1 ; ; a k ), 1 k r (this relation is empty if R i = ?). We say that p(i) is sd-preferred to p 0 (i) (where sd stands for stochastic dominance) if
iat for all t; 1 t k and we write p(i)
Note that sdindi¤erence is just equality. We say that p(i)
, so that at least one of the inequalities above is strict; then we write p(i) sd i p 0 (i). We now de…ne the three normative properties key to the discussion of random assignment mechanisms.
The feasible assignment
For a deterministic assignment, OE and EPE are the same thing, but for general random assignments OE is a strictly stronger requirement than EPE. A deterministic mechanism (i.e., selecting F ( ) = P 2 P d (E( )) for any problem) cannot be Envy-Free, so EF requires randomization. The Probabilistic Serial mechanism, explained in the next section, is Ordinally e…cient and Envy-Free, and the only example to date of a random mechanism with these two properties.
The assignment mechanism F is Strategy-proof (SP) if for all , all i 2 N , and all R 0 i 2 R(A) we have p(i)
where F (N; A; R) = P and F (N; A; (R 0 i ; R i )) = P 0 The simplest example of a strategyproof mechanism is the Fixed -Priority mechanism, where is an arbitrary ordering = fi 1 ; i 2 ; ; i n g of the agents in N : agent i 1 gets her best acceptable object in R i 1 , next agent i 2 gets his best remaining acceptable object in R i 2 , if any, and so on. This mechanism is clearly Strategy-Proof and Ordinally E¢ cient, thus its guaranteed size is at least if it is odd. Moreover, the same example also shows that the guaranteed size of any deterministic strategyproof mechanism cannot be more than 1 2 if m is even, or
There is in fact no assignment mechanism meeting OE, EF, and SP (Theorem 2 in [8] ). However the two benchmark mechanisms known as Random Priority (RP ) and Probabilistic Serial (P S) almost …t the bill. Here we only discuss P S, postponing until section 7 the discussion of RP.
The simplest de…nition of the Probabilistic Serial (P S) mechanism P S is recursive. 5 Each agent …lls his allocation by eating at constant speed 1, from time t = 0 until at most time t = 1, from her best acceptable object still available. At time 0, one unit of each object is available. For brevity we only illustrate the de…nition by an example with 5 agents and 4 objects. Here a is the best object for agents 1; 2; 3, b is best for 4; 5, and c; d for nobody. Then a is fully eaten at time t = 1 3 , and 1; 2; 3 each get a 1 3 share of it. Suppose agent 1 only accepts a, then she is done; say the next acceptable object is b for agent 2 and c for agent 3. Then starting from t = , and is divided in 4 9 for each of 4 and 5, and 1 9 for agent 2; and so on.
The P S mechanism is Ordinally E¢ cient, Envy-Free, but not Strategy-Proof. That is, under the premises of this axiom, the preference 
Size versus Envy-Freeness: the result
We compute …rst the guaranteed m-size index m (P S) of the P S mechanism. Then we show that this is the best feasible guaranteed size index for any Envy-Free mechanism.
The main clue comes from considering the following canonical diagonal problem of size m, denoted m . This problem already played a role in three relevant earlier papers: [17] , [12] , and [9] . There are m agents N = f1; ; mg and m objects A = fa 1 ;
; a m g, and agent i's preferences are R i = (a m ; a m 1 ;
; a i ). One interpre-tation is of a scheduling problem where objects are time slots (higher label means earlier time) and agents are jobs that are processed in exactly one time slot; each job prefers an earlier slot, and job i has a deadline at time i (cannot be
; m 1, , who each get a share 1 m 1 ; and so on until the critical object a km such that
Object a km+1 is eaten in full, but not so object a km : agents k m ; k m 1; ; 1, can only eat a full unit, therefore their share of a km is 1 ( It turns out that the canonical diagonal pro…le achieves the worst possible size index for the P S mechanism, on all problems of A m .
The m-size index of any Envy-Free mechanism is at most r m .
There are ine¢ cient Envy-Free mechanisms with a worst performance than P S: for instance we can assign objects sequentially, uniformly among all the still unmatched agents, throwing the object away if it is not acceptable to the winner; this gives the index m+1 2 at m . We conjecture that the following re…nement of statement ii) is true: the m-size index of any Ordinally E¢ cient and Envy-Free mechanism is r m . The intuition comes from the following result about the class D m of problems such that, for a common ordering fa 1 ;
; a m g of the objects, all individual preferences take the form R k = (a m ; a m 1 ;
; a k ); thus D m contains m , as well as problems with di¤erent numbers of preferences R k for each k. Theorem 1 in [9] states that if F is Ordinally E¢ cient and EnvyFree, it coincides with P S on D m . The conjecture is that the problems m are also the worst case con…guration for F .
The Random Priority mechanism
The RP mechanism runs the Fixed -Priority mechanism after selecting randomly and with uniform probability on all orderings of N . It is StrategyProof and Ex Post E¢ cient, but not Ordinally E¢ cient. Moreover, RP is not EnvyFree, that is to say in the assignment P = RP ( ), the sd-preference p(i)
for some i; j; however p(j)
either. In other words, based on her ordinal preferences R i only, agent i never has a compelling reason to envy agent j's allocation. This latter property is called Weak Envy-Freeness.
Our Theorem is helpful to place an upper bound on the guaranteed m-size index of RP . Recall that Theorem 1 in [12] states that s(RP ( )) s(P S( )) for all m and all 2 D m (de…ned in the previous paragraph). In particular s(RP ( m )) s(P S( m )), and this inequality is strict as soon as m 4. Combined with our Theorem, this implies m (RP ) r m .
Next [17] show that their Ranking algorithm yields the lower bound 1 (1 1 m+1 ) m , which converges to 1 1 e , precisely at the canonical diagonal pro…le m . Now Ranking is the same algorithm as Random Priority when preferences are identical (but acceptable objects vary across agents). From there [20] deduces the general lower bound 1 (1
We conclude that the performance of RP is inferior to that of P S, but not asymptotically so.
Concluding comments
1. Other worst case indices to measure the welfare performance of RP , P S, and other random assignment mechanisms, are proposed in [3] . Their linear welfare factor uses Borda scores as a proxy for cardinal utilities; the performance of P S is nearly 2 3 , and is superior to that of RP . More work is needed to understand the connection of those results to ours.
2. Many concrete instances of assignments to jobs, schools, etc.., forces participants to report only a …xed number q 0 of acceptable objects, while other objects are deemed unacceptable by the mechanism. It is therefore natural to look for the the guaranteed sizes of RP and P S in this context.
3. In many assignment instances, there are exogenous di¤erences between the agents so that it matters more to match some agents, or some objects, than others. An example is the assignment of overdemanded slots in Dutch universities, where a student record increases her probability of admission. The design objective is now to maximize a weighted sum of the matches, as discussed in [21] for bilateral matching, and in [13] for the assignment problem. The hard question is how should we adapt RP and P S to take this new objective into account? 
and the latter inequality follows from the assumption k m+1 > k.
Step 3 
Theorem 8.2.1 Statement i)
It remains to prove m (P S) m r m .
Step 1 an auxiliary result
In this step we consider the variant of the model where in addition to N; A; R, a problem speci…es a common positive capacity for each agent, and a pro…le of non negative capacities = ( a ) a2A for the objects. An augmented assignment problem is now e = (N; A; R; ; ), and an assignment is a N A non negative ma-
for all a and P A p ia for all i. We drop the probabilistic interpretation of P , where p ia was the probabilty that agent i is assigned to object a, and think instead of the deterministic assignment of q divisible commodities, such that the initial endowment of good a is a and agent i cannot consume more than units in total.The size of P is s(P ) = P N A p ia as before, and represents now the total capacity assigned at P . Note that s(P ) minfn ; P A a g. Although the RP mechanism is no longer de…ned, the eating algorithm runs for units of time and works as before, thus de…ning a feasible assignment P S( e ).
Lemma 2 Fix " > 0 and two augmented problems e = (N; A; R; ; ) , e 0 = (N; A; R; ; 0 ), such that 0 . Then
Proof By induction on the number of objects. The statement is obvious if q = 1. Fix now q and assume the property holds until q 1. Choose e , e 0 , two augmented problems with q objects, that only di¤er in that 0 a = a + " for a single object a and " > 0. We must prove s(P ) s(P 0 ) s(P ) + ", where P; P 0 are the corresponding assignments under P S. We write D; D 0 for the two corresponding eating algorithms, and b (z), If in D object a is fully consumed at time , then D 0 = D and we are done. Now we assume that a "dies" at some time t; t < . If any other object dies at t in D, then D and D 0 coincide up to t, and the restriction of
] is simply P S applied to two augmented problems with at most q 1 objects, capacities ( t) for agents, (t) and 0 (t) for objects, that only di¤er in that 0 a (t) = " while a (t) = 0, so we can apply the inductive assumption. Thus we assume now that only object a dies at t, and we de…ne t 0 to be the …rst time after t where an object dies in D 0 , or t 0 = if there is no such object. Note that in D 0 , a is not dead at t, and no agent can die or switch objects during the interval [t; t 0 ], because this only happens when some object dies. We compare now D [t 0 ; ] and D 0 [t 0 ; ] : they are P S applied to two augmented problems with at most q 1 objects (for b dying at t 0 in D 0 , we just showed b (t 0 ) = 0 as well), so by the inductive assumption
We also have two accounting identities
and the equalities
Combining those and the two previous equalities gives
Plugging this in the right hand inequality in ( ; a k ), k 2, and R 0 i = (a 1 ; ; a k 0 ) with k 0 < k} or { R i = (a 1 ) and R 0 i = ?}. Then s(P S( 0 )) s(P S( )).
Proof We use the the notation of the previous proof. It is enough to assume that a single agent i truncates her preferences from R i = (a 1 ;
; a k ), k 2, to R 0 i = (a 1 ; ; a k 1 ), or from R i = (a 1 ) to R 0 i = ?. If in the P S algorithm D at R agent i eats no a k , then the P S algorithm D 0 at R 0 is identical. If i eats k units of object a k starting at time t, then it is the last object she eats. Therefore the restriction e D of D to N fig and to interval [t; 1] is P S applied to the augmented problem e with capacities = 1 t for agents, b (t) for each b 6 = a k , and a k (t) 
and the conclusion follows from combining this inequality with
Step 2 proof of statement i)
We …x now an arbitrary (non augmented) problem 0 = (N; A; R) of size m, and we must prove s(P S( 0 )) mr m . We construct …rst another problem resembling the canonical diagonal problem m , and such that s(P S( )) s(P S( 0 )). Pick an e¢ cient deterministic assignment P 2 P d (E( 0 )) where m agents are matched to m objects. It is well known, and easy to check, that we can order these agents f1;
; mg and these objects fa m ; ; a 1 g in such a way that P assigns object a i to agent i, so a i 2 R i , and a i is the best object for agent i among fa i ;
; a 1 g (some of which may not be acceptable to i). By Lemma 3 if we …x R i = ? for all agents unmatched at P , and for each i 2 f1; ; mg we truncate R i at a i , thus making all objects fa i ;
; a 1 g unacceptable, then the expected size of the resulting problem is weakly smaller than at 0 . We now show s(P S( )) mr m . Let fi 1 ; i 2 ;
; i H g the set of agents in f1; ; mg who do not get a full allocation in P S( ) ( P A p ia < 1), ordered according to the time t 1 t 2 t H at which they die in the P S algorithm. Set h = t h t h 1 , with the convention t 0 = 0. Then agent i h eats P h l=1 l , therefore
We set k = m H and list H inequalities that the non negative numbers h must satisfy: (k + H) 1 1 , because at least object a i 1 is dead at t 1 ; (k + H) 1 + (k + H 1) 2 2 , because at least objects a i 1 ; a i 2 are dead at t 2 , and in [t 1 ; t 2 ] one agent is absent;
and for all h; 1 h H:
because objects a i 1 ; ; a i h are dead at t h , and l 1 agents are dead in [t l 1 ; t l ]. De…ne = f = ( h ) 2 R H + j meets (4) for all h; 1 h Hg. Then s(P S( )) k + min 2 P H h=1 (H + 1 h) h . We claim that the value of the latter program is P 1 h=H h k+h . To check this, we change variables to h = (k + H + 1 h) h , so the program becomes h for all h; 1 h H Its optimal solution is h = 1 for all h. Indeed if 1 > 1, a transfer from 1 to 2 lowers the objective, so 1 must be 1; and so on. We just proved s(P S( )) k + P 1 h=H h k+h , and this sum is k + P 1 h=H (1 k k+h ) = m kS(m; k). Finally we check that the sequence k ! kS(m; k) is single-peaked with its peak at k m , implying s(P S( )) m k m S(m; k m ) = mr m . This is because the inequality kS(m; k) (k + 1)S(m; k + 1) (resp. <) is rearranged as S(m; k) 1 (resp. S(m; k) > 1).
Statement ii)
Consider the canonical diagonal pro…le m and an Envy-Free assignment P 2 P(E( m )). We check s(P ) mr m .
Because a m is the top object for everyone, EF implies p iam = p jam = x m for all i; j. Because a m 1 is the second best object for agents 1;
; m 1, and they all eat the same amount of a m , EF implies p ia m 1 = p ja m 1 = x m 1 for all i; j m 1. Repeating the argument we see that for all k, p ia k = x k is independent of i k. Feasibility w.r.t objects gives kx k 1, and w.r.t. agent 1 it gives P m k=1 x k 1. Moreover s(P ) = P m k=1 kx k . Now we claim mr m = max
If x is optimal, x k > 0 and x k+1 < 1 k+1 cannot both be true, otherwise a transfer from x k to x k+1 improves the objective. Hence there is at most one k such that 0 < x k < 1 k , and then x k = 0 for k < k , and x k = 1 k for k > k . Call this case 1. Case 2 is when no such k exists, then x k = 0 up to some e k, after which x k = 1 k . In Case 1 we have P m k=1 x k = S(m; k )+x k 1, in particular S(m; k ) 1. Moreover this constraint must be tight, else we can improve the objective by raising x k . Therefore 1 S(m; k ) = x k < 1 k , S(m; k 1) > 1 ) k = k m . Now P m k=1 kx k = m k + k x k = m k m S(m; k m ) as desired.
In Case 2 we have P m k=1 x k = S(m; e k) 1, implying e k k m . Moreover P m k=1 kx k = m e k ) P m k=1 kx k m k m m k m S(m; k m ).
